Amphibious Operations: Joint Publication 3-02

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Future maneuver warfare and amphibious operations are. The second focal area Chapters 4 and 5 addresses deployment, employment, and sustainment of Marine Corps forces at the operational and tactical levels of war. The second focal area takes the art of campaigning into understanding battlespace, in particular the joint battlespace at the operational level of war. It addresses the critical roles of the Marine Corps component commanders and MAGTF commanders in force deployment planning and execution.

Arranging operations, combat power, effects, information operations, and the warfighting functions are discussed in relation to higher order doctrine linked to planning and executing successful operations. MCDP devotes a full chapter to the critical role of logistics in generating rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible MAGTFs that can rapidly reconstitute. The chapter gives readers a good view of how and why the Marine Corps , in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of MAGTF expeditionary warfighting capabilities.

It describes how MAGTF commanders and their staffs apply Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy and doctrine as described in MCDP 1, Warfighting, and its companion doctrinal publications to planning and conducting expeditionary operations. The chapter provides the foundation for MAGTF tactical operations because it discusses the importance of single battle, decisive and shaping actions, centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, main and supporting efforts, security, and the reserve. The chapter describes operational design and addresses how the MAGTF commander plans and conducts expeditionary operations.

It also identifies the tactical tenets essential to succeeding on the battlefield. Chapter 7 focuses on the offense as the decisive form of combat. Chapter 8 describes defensive operations conducted in conjunction with offensive operations to defeat enemy attacks and conducting MAGTF operations within the context of the single battle. Chapter 9 addresses other tactical operations that enable the MAGTF to execute offensive and defensive operations.

These tactical operations include retrograde, passage of lines, linkup, relief in place, obstacle crossing, and breakout from encirclement. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational alliance or coalition military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

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Joint Publication Jp 3-02 Amphibious Operations 10 August 2009

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DOD Joint Doctrine on Amphibious Operations (Aug )

Please apply exchange offer again. Your item has been added to Shortlist. View All. Return form will be sent to your email Id:. Instructions for using Embed codes. Embedding articles is subject to our Terms of use. Amphibious warfare involves military operations that are launched from the sea by an amphibious force embarked in ships or craft. The primary purpose of these operations is the introduction of a landing force ashore.

This landing force can be offensive, defensive, or humanitarian in nature. The ultimate goal of amphibious warfare is to contribute substantially to the attainment of those national strategic objectives that require the ability to project combat power onto a landmass from the sea.

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Modern major amphibious operations are complex and require extensive specialized sea- and air-based logistical support. As such, they can be undertaken and sustained only by nations with well-developed land and sea combat capabilities. Projecting combat power ashore has been a part of military and naval operations since antiquity. Some historical examples of landing operations include Greek landings against the Persians at Mycale in September BCE; the Norman invasion of England in ; the Japanese invasion of Korea during the 16th century; the British and French attempts to land at Gallipoli in what is now Turkey between February and December ; numerous American landings in the South, Southwest, Central, and Western Pacific, —; and the amphibious demonstrations and rehearsals leading up to the opening of the ground war in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, in January and February Military leaders exercising overall command of both land and sea forces undertook the earliest of these actions.

Dividing the command of the naval and landing forces between admirals and generals, respectively, an innovation introduced in modern times, created many planning and force coordination problems that proved very difficult to solve.

One of the most significant aspects of the history of modern amphibious warfare, therefore, is how military leaders analyzed these problems and eventually overcame them. Three nations, in particular, developed solutions for the problems associated with landing operations by the beginning of World War II.

The British failed to maintain an amphibious capability during the s and s. This failure was due to several reasons. First, they were stung by their failure at Gallipoli. Second, they viewed amphibious operations to be of doubtful importance in any war that could be foreseen. Third, they were financially hamstrung during the interwar period.

The impetus of World War II finally made them look at landing operations seriously in By that time, however, they were far behind both the Japanese and the Americans and had to play rapid catch-up.

The U.S. Amphibious Operations During BALTOPS 2018

The doctrine they developed placed great emphasis on surprise, landing troops where the enemy's defenses were weakest or, preferably, nonexistent. The Japanese, on the other hand, viewed amphibious landing capability to be of the utmost importance, especially in a war with the United States. Such a war seemed more and more inevitable as the years passed. To prepare for it, they developed during the s and s a doctrine of amphibious assault that emphasized landing troops in the teeth of an enemy's defenses. The Japanese army took the lead in developing this doctrine.

The Imperial Navy contributed to the development of naval gunfire support, the movement of troops from ships to the shore, and other areas of a purely naval nature, but it was the army that dominated the process. The United States, like Japan, undertook during the interwar period the development of a doctrine for moving troops ashore against determined opposition.

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Unlike Japan, however, the two American sea services, the U. Navy and the Marine Corps, were principally responsible for this development. The Americans decided to study closely the British and French failure in the Dardanelles. The problem at Gallipoli, to their minds, was not in the concept of assaulting a defended beach but in the lack on the part of the British and French of a doctrine for doing so. Taking action based on this conclusion, the Marine Corps Schools stopped holding classes for several weeks beginning in November to develop a set of effective guidelines.


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Navy and giving it wide distribution within both of the sea services. This document, with modifications, provided the foundation for navy and Marine Corps amphibious operations from the landings at Guadalcanal in August to those at Okinawa in April It broke landing operations down into six components:.

The U. In Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower oversaw an amalgamation of British and American doctrine, ultimately producing the plan for the invasion of Normandy in June This plan, relative to FTP , placed too much emphasis on air support and did not allow for enough naval gunfire support of the landings. In the Southwest Pacific, because of the size of many of the islands in that area, Douglas MacArthur did not have to land troops in the teeth of Japanese defenses as often as was necessary in the Central Pacific. Also, landings in the Southwest Pacific had to take place within range of Japanese land-based air power, a situation that was very dangerous for the supporting naval assets.

MacArthur's amphibious commanders, therefore, developed a doctrine that emphasized putting troops ashore quickly where the Japanese were weak or not present and then withdrawing the majority of supporting ships from the area. The best examples of these types of landings were the operations undertaken as MacArthur's forces made their way along the northern coast of New Guinea from January until December Army's modifications in Europe and the Southwest Pacific of the basic doctrine contained in FTP , it has been argued, constituted the creation of two additional doctrinal traditions.

The basis for all three, however, was the sixfold division of landing operations that had been developed during the s. Lessons learned during World War II were incorporated into this basic doctrine, the one promulgated as FTP , and the improved version provided guidance for U. By the late s, however, weapons technology had developed to the point where the landing of troops in the teeth of an enemy's defenses seemed problematic at best.

The British experience in the Falklands in showed just how lethal some of these new weapons could be.